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Abstract 
Thispaper compares two instances where the  political use of law, 
specifically labor legislation, was used to effect broader social change 
during the early 1980s.  The two cases  focused on are the Thatcher 
administration in Great Britain and the Mitter and government in 
France. These divergent cases are instructive as much for their 
similarities as for their differences. Though the two governments had 
opposite intentions in terms of the role that organized labor would 
play  in their respective societies, each relied on extensive labor law 
reform as a means to achieve their objectives.   The eventual outcomes 
of these two political  experiments were also similar: power  of 
organized labor was undermined in both countries, albeit in the one 
case intentionally and in the other unintentionally.   Overall this 
comparison provides  insight into the  problematic  nature of state 
projects, particularly  when law is used to achieve specific social and 
political  aims. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Comparative research on postwar industrial relations in North 
America and Western Europe usually converges on a singular narrative 
of historical development.  The tale typically goes as follows.  After 
World War II many Western nations tentatively established what have 
been labeled as "postwar settlements" (Altvater et al, 1986) or "labor 
accords" (Edwards and Podgursky,  1986).  Though their specific 
character varied widely across national boundaries, these institutional 
arrangements commonly entailed collaborative mechanisms allowing 
 
 
 
leading representatives of labor, capital, and the state to work in 
concert as they strove to rationalize and stabilize the frequently 
tumultuous arena of industrial affairs.  Embedded within and 
ultimately dependent upon a broader context of robust economic 
growth, these settlements were however destined to a precarious 
existence.  Not surprisingly, when the space for political and economic 
compromise was reduced by the crises of the early 1970s, great strain 
was put on the labor accords as well (Krieger, 1986:22-38). 
As this familiar story continues, political experimentation with 
alternative industrial relations policies thus became a pressing 
requirement for many capitalist democracies during the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  Government leaders typically followed one of two 
divergent paths as they tried to restore economic growth and industrial 
stability to their respective nations.  A corporatist tack was pursued by 
some, which relied on extending the state's role in economic 
coordination and further institutionalized postwar Keynesian practices. 
A neo-liberal course was followed by others, which involved a  
political retreat from industrial relations management and a greater 
reliance on market discipline (Jessop et al, 1986:8-9).  Regardless of 
the particular path chosen, state-driven transformations of industrial 
relations during this era were usually multifaceted endeavors entailing 
variable arrays of policy initiatives and differing levels of reform. 
Indeed, while some state projects entailed piecemeal attempts at either 
buttressing or dismantling what remained of the institutional 
frameworks of the original postwar settlements, others tried to 
fundamentally restructure national industrial relations systems as a 
whole. 
It is state ventures of the latter type that are the subject of this 
paper.  Specifically, my primary focus is on the extensive labor law 
reforms implemented in Great Britain and France during the early 
1980s.  I feel comparing these two historical cases is instructive not 
only for their differences but also for their similarities.  In terms of 
differences, the two governments had opposite intentions with respect 
 
 
 
 
to the role they saw organized labor playing in their respective national 
political economies.  The neo-liberalist Thatcher administration hoped 
to significantly diminish, if not entirely eliminate, the influence of 
labor unions in Great Britain, while Mitterrand's socialist government 
tried to enhance the position of labor unions as it moved France further 
in a corporatist direction.  Despite contrary goals, however, political 
actors in both countries relied on sweeping changes in labor law as a 
primary means to achieve their objectives.  Furthermore, the outcomes 
of these two political experiments were also remarkably alike, with the 
power of organized labor being undermined in both countries; though 
in the one case this indicated success and in the other it signaled 
failure. 
 
LABOR LAW REFORM IN GREAT BRITAIN: NEO- 
LIBERALISM AND 'THE ENEMY WITHIN' 
To understand the far-reaching labor law reforms enacted by the 
Thatcher administration throughout the 1980s, three things about 
British politics and industrial relations during the previous decade need 
to be considered.  First, due recognition must be given to the relatively 
strident version of neo-liberal ideology that permeated virtually all 
facets of the Thatcher government's policies and practices.  While in 
opposition to Labour's James Callaghan administration from 1974 to 
1979, the Conservative Party rallied fervently around a pro-market 
platform premised on the assumption that government de-regulation, 
privatization, and related policies would best stimulate British 
economic growth.  This contrasted sharply with the incumbent party's 
state-directed approach to economic recovery, which with each passing 
year was proving to be more and more unsuccessful (Krieger, 1986). 
A second point of consideration involves the Thatcher 
administration's pointed position on organized labor, a stance broadly 
forged by neo-liberal predilections but also sharpened in the fires of 
historical experience.  Though the Conservative Party's relationship 
with labor unions had traditionally fluctuated "between co-operation 
and confrontation" (Johnson,  1993:217), a more staunch anti-unionism 
 
 
 
 
developed as the 1970s progressed.  This was in part the product of 
Thatcher's particular brand of neo-liberalism, which drew heavily on 
the writings of the economist F. A. Hayek.  Hayek (1980) had argued 
that organized labor was the primary culprit in Britain's long-term 
economic decline because it undermined the "natural" operation of 
labor markets and artificially inflated wages.  From this vantage point, 
labor unions were viewed by many Conservatives as the "enemy 
within"(e.g. MacGregor,  1986).  This primarily ideological opposition 
to organized labor was further fortified by the practical failures of the 
Callaghan government, most notably its inability to control trade 
unions.  The tumultuous  "Winter of Discontent" in 1978-79, m.rked 
by large-scale strikes and widespread disruptions of public services, 
served to convince the electorate that the Conservative Party's 
diagnosis of the country's ills was on the mark.  Consequently, 
Thatcher easily captured office in the general election of 1979 (Krieger 
1986:10). 
The Callaghan administration was not the first British government 
to suffer electoral defeat because of an inability to curtail trade union 
militancy.  This leads to a third point of consideration with respect to 
understanding the nature of the Thatcher labor law project.  Long 
characterized by a "voluntaristic" system, wherein labor and capital 
resolved employment issues relatively free from political intervention, 
British industrial relations witnessed greater government involvement 
as the 1960s and 1970s progressed.  Culminating this trend, 
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath passed the Industrial 
Relations Act of 1971 shortly after his election to office in 1970.  This 
sweeping piece of legislation required unions to register with the 
government for legitimate recognition, transformed collective 
bargaining agreements into binding legal contracts, and made unlawful 
a wide range of unions practices, including the closed shop, secondary 
boycotts, and sympathetic action (McCarthy,  1992:20).  Organized 
labor essentially ignored these legal provisions and responded with 
widespread strikes to protest the Act as well as other facets of the 
 
 
 
 
administration's policies.   In 1974, Heath "used the occasion of a 
national miners' strike to call an election" (Krieger, 1986:107), in 
effect asking the electorate who governs Britain, the unions or his 
Conservative administration?   The election of Labor's Callaghan 
signaled the public's answer, and the 1971 Act was immediately 
repealed (McCarthy,  1992:26). 
With this historical background in place, I now address specifics 
of the Thatcher administration's labor law reforms.  During its three 
terms in office, the Thatcher government implemented five pieces of 
employment legislation affecting the activities of labor unions.  The 
first piece of legislation, the Employment Act of 1980, included 
provisions targeting three key areas.  First, Sections 1 and 2 of the 
1980 Act facilitated the use of secret ballots by unions with respect to 
such issues as industrial action, officer elections, and organizational 
procedures.   Section 1 allowed for government reimbursement of 
"trade unions for some of the expenditure incurred in holding certain 
ballots" while Section 2 required employers to allow unions to use 
workplace premises to conduct such balloting (Mackie, 1981:6-7). 
Though seemingly beneficial to union interests, the underlying 
rationale of the Thatcher administration's efforts in this area was the 
belief that "the existence of undemocratic procedures  [within labor 
organizations allowed] unrepresentative  militants excessive influence" 
(Shackleton,  1998:588).  More importantly, as will later become 
evident, these initially moderate reforms were to lay the foundation for 
more extensive balloting provisions in subsequent legislation. 
Two other areas addressed by the 1980 legislation were the closed 
union shop and union industrial conflict strategies.  Section 7 
"widen[ed] the grounds for claiming unfair dismissal when a person is 
dismissed for non-membership of a trade union where a [union 
membership agreement] applies" (Mackie,  1981:7).  In particular, 
individuals could not be fired from a closed union shop if their lack of 
membership was based on personal convictions or if employment by a 
particular firm began before union membership requirements were put 
in place.  With respect to industrial conflict, Section 16 narrowed the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
definition of legal picketing to workers picketing at their own place of 
employment or union officials picketing at places where they 
represented workers. Under the new law, union members were now 
open to court injunctions and monetary damages if they picketed 
illegally. Section 17 of the 1980 Act also restricted unions from 
encouraging others to engage in sympathetic actions such as 
"blacking", or refusing to handle, materials and supplies destined to an 
employer in dispute (Mackie, 1981:9-10). 
Compared to the 1980 legislation, the Employment Act of 1982 
was slightly narrower in focus but had deeper effects on union 
practices. In terms of the closed shop, Section 3 of the 1982 Act made 
more stringent the conditions under which non-union employees could 
be dismissed from a workplace covered by a union membership 
agreement. Sections 4, 5 and 6 represented significant changes in 
labor law by introducing "a new regime of compensation for 
employees who are deemed to be unfairly dismissed for reasons 
relating to union membership" (Lewis and Simpson, 1982:236).  Other 
sections of the  1982 legislation further curtailed labor union activities 
relating to the closed shop.  Specifically, Sections 12 and 13 prohibited 
the establishment of commercial contracts that contained language 
pertaining to union membership requirements, while Section 14 
effectively outlawed strikes designed to protect existing, or to impose 
new, closed shop agreements (Mackie,  1983:89-90). 
While the 1982 Employment Act indirectly undermined the 
closed shop by encircling the practice with a variety of restrictions, 
strikes by unions were attacked directly in this piece of legislation. 
Section 18 fundamentally narrowed the realm of legitimate strike 
activity to only those disputes between workers and their employers 
and to only over issues relating to the employment conditions of the 
workers involved.  Strikes between groups of workers, unions and 
employer associations, or unions and the government were no longer 
legal, nor were strikes over political issues or closed shop practices 
(Dunn, 1985:102).  More significantly, Section 15 now made unions 
 
 
 
 
liable for damages stemming from industrial disputes and other 
activities.  Prior to the 1982 Act, unions as collective entities were 
traditionally considered "immune" from tort actions and only 
individual members or specific leaders were open to lawsuits (Ewing, 
1982:218-219).  Though opening labor organizations themselves to 
lawsuits, Sections 16 and 17 of the 1982 Act did place restrictions on 
the conditions under which unions could be sued and for how much 
(Mackie,  1983:90-91). 
With the Trade Union Act of 1984, the Thatcher administration's 
labor law project turned its attention back to balloting, an issue initially 
addressed in the 1980 Act.  The 1984 Act contained three parts, each 
of which ostensibly promoted greater union democracy.  Part I set a 
variety of requirements for the periodic election of union leaders. 
Section 1, for example, required that positions on a union's national 
executive council be open to electoral competition every five years. 
Other provisions in Part I set guidelines on election procedures, 
eligible voters, and the legal measures that individual union members 
could take if they felt that their union had not complied with election 
regulations (Mackie,  1984:94-95). 
Part II of the 1984 legislation contained two sections pertaining to 
balloting on industrial action by unions.  Section 10 required that all 
union industrial actions be voted on and approved by a majority of the 
membership.   Ifno ballot was held, the specific industrial action was 
considered illegal and exposed the union to possible court injunctions 
and damage claims (Mackie, 1984:96).  Section 11 addressed the 
specific procedures that were to be used in conducting a ballot.  Many 
of these requirements were so rigorous that unions ran a high risk of 
having the ballot rendered illegitimate.  For example, the wording on 
ballots had to explicitly forewarn workers that by engaging in 
industrial action they would be in breach of their employment 
contracts and possibly subject to dismissal.  Further, if all those 
involved in a specific action had not been balloted, or some workers 
not involved in a particular action were balloted, the ballot would 
become invalid (Mackie, 1984:86-87).  Finally, Part III of the 1984 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Union Act contained a number of provisions dealing with the 
political funds held by most unions.  The amount paid into these funds 
and to what use they were put was now subject to balloting 
requirements similar to those that had been imposed on other union 
activities. 
After the enactment of the 1984 legislation, the principal 
components of the Thatcher administration's labor law project were 
fundamentally in place.  The last two pieces of labor legislation 
implemented under Thatcher, the Employment Acts of 1988 and 1990, 
essentially represented  elaborations of provisions introduced earlier. 
The 1988 Act, for example, contained responsive adjustments to 
requirements pertaining to balloting, the closed shop, and industrial 
action that were deemed necessary in light of problems and 
"experiences of union resistance to earlier legal controls" (Mackie, 
1988:265).  The 1990 Act was also primarily "a logical extension of 
the industrial relations laws post  1979", with incremental changes 
being added to many earlier provisions (Carty, 1991:12). 
When taken as whole, the incremental legislative reforms of three 
successive Thatcher administrations over the course of the 1980s 
eventually culminated in a revolutionary restructuring of British 
industrial relations.  Unions had been forcibly democratized by an 
array of balloting provisions, and the ability of unions to protect and 
maintain the closed shop had been effectively nullified.  And, as noted 
by Carty (1991:12-13), by 1990 it had become decidedly clear "that 
the very basis of trade union power--the ability to take effective 
industrial action--[was] rejected by the Government".  The labor law 
reforms of the Thatcher administration were thus designed with an eye 
toward strictly curtailing the role played by organized labor within 
British industrial relations.  The degree to which this objective was 
successfully met is an issue that I will address shortly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like their British counterparts, French voters responded to the 
economic crises of the early 1970s by electing to power an 
administration promising a marked departure from recent  
governmental practices and policies.  Under the rule of President 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing from  1974 to 1981, "France took a step back 
towards laissez-faire not unlike that taken by the Thatcher Government 
in Great Britain after 1979" (Hall, 1986:189).  France's neo-liberal 
detour proved relatively short-lived however.  The Giscard 
government's retreat from economic management  did not restore 
growth and French voters concluded that they may have chosen a 
wrong path to economic recovery.  The political compass swung back 
toward the country's more familiar statist tack, and indeed went 
beyond to uncharted territory. In May of 1981, Francois Mitterrand 
became the first Socialist elected President of France, and in June of 
that year his Socialist Party achieved a majority in the National 
Assembly. In light of this popular mandate, Mitterrand eagerly 
pursued the implementation of the party's interventionist platform in 
the hope of leading France in a grand "Socialist experiment" (Hall, 
1986:191-192). 
The Mitterrand  government's  'Socialist experiment'  initially took 
the form of a fairly robust "redistributive Keynsianism" (Hall, 
1986:193). Throughout the latter part of 1981 and early 1982, 
economic demand was stimulated by raising family allowances and 
housing allocations, by expanding health and pension benefits, by 
raising the minimum wage, and by the creation thousands of 
government jobs.   However, in addition to the Keynesian thrust, 
Mitterrand's project also included "a radical agenda [for] modernizing 
and humanizing the workplace, and [a promise] to strengthen trade 
unions in their conflict with employers" (Howell,  1996:147).  Driving 
this particular agenda was the ideology of autogestion, "a new kind of 
socialism" that many in the French Socialist Party had become 
enamored with while in opposition during the 1970s (Smith, 1987:46). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integral to this autogestionnaire ideology was the notion of democratic 
self-management, both by workers and employers within the firm and 
by unions and employer representatives at the industry level (Hall, 
1986:193). 
In pursuit of its autogestionnaire program, the Mitterrand 
administration enacted five pieces of labor legislation between  1982 
and 1983.  Labeled after Jean Auroux, the Minister of Labor who 
helped author them, the "Auroux Laws" transformed and "almost 
completely [rewrote] the French Labor Code" that was originally 
implemented in 1950 (Glendon, 1984:450).  There were four primary 
objectives of the new legislation.  One was to stimulate and expand 
collective bargaining practices throughout French industrial relations. 
A related goal was to strengthen and further institutionalize existing 
organizations representing worker interests.  A third objective involved 
the creation of worker expression groups within the firm.  The 
extension of many of the legal rights and provisions, both old and new, 
to public sector industrial relations was the final goal (Gallie, 
1985:208; Smith, 1987:53). 
The first piece of legislation, titled Liberties of Workers within 
Enterprises ("Law I"), was adopted on August 4, 1982 and addressed 
the rights of individual workers in three key areas.  Changes in the first 
two areas, that of work rules and disciplinary procedures, effectively 
represented elaborations of earlier provisions already in the French 
Labor Code.  Specifically, requirements for written rules and 
procedures governing selected firms with twenty or more employees 
were now "extended to cover almost all private and public employers" 
(Glendon, 1984:452).  The hope was that a greater formalization would 
limit employer discretion and arbitrariness. 
The third area addressed by Law I drew directly on 
autogestionnaire ideology and granted workers "the direct and 
collective right of expression" with respect to both working conditions 
and the content of work (Smith, 1987:49).  In effect, all French firms 
were to create employee participation groups that allowed workers to 
 
 
 
air grievances, share ideas, and express concerns with management 
representatives without fear of reprisal.  Other than mandating that 
such workplace expression groups be created, the new legislation did 
not however set any specific requirements on their particular form. 
Rather, the law simply required that in firms with two hundred or more 
employees, "negotiations between employer and unions must take 
place in order to specify [the] frequency, size, duration and 
organization" of the expression groups (Smith  1987:49). 
Auroux Law II, titled Development  of Employee Representative 
Institutions, was adopted on October 28, 1982.  Changes embodied in 
this legislation not only addressed the role of unions, but two other 
means of representing worker interests as well: employee 
representatives and shop committees.  While these three different 
institutions converged in the same general interest, they did serve 
different functions within the French workplace.  Employee 
representatives were elected by firm workers and acted as 
intermediaries in firm-level grievance procedures.   Shop committees, 
consisting of elected employees and union representatives, served a 
consultative role on a wide range of issues, but had no decision- 
making power.  Labor unions were directly involved in establishing 
collective bargaining agreements, though such negotiations were 
typically done at the industry, not at the company or firm, level 
(Glendon,  1984:460). 
Changes enacted by Law II pertaining to employee 
representatives and shop committees were for the most part "only 
minor" and "relatively modest", essentially extending these 
mechanisms to smaller firms and expanding their power in limited 
areas (Glendon, 1984:461-62).  With respect to unions, however, Law 
II "was designed and seem[ed] likely to appreciably strengthen the 
presence of unions within companies and to promote unionization 
generally" (Glendon, 1984:466).  In particular, union rights were 
expanded in two key areas.  First, the right to form a union section, 
originally limited to firms with fifty or more employees by a 1968 
addendum to the French Labor Code, was now extended to all firms 
 
 
 
 
 
regardless of size. Second, union leaders and members were given 
more privileges in terms of workplace activities, such as the right to 
collect dues during working hours, the right to more hours set aside for 
union activities, and greater protections against dismissal for union 
activities (Glendon, 1984:466-469). 
Collective Bargaining and the Regulation of Labor Conflict, the 
title for Auroux Law III, was enacted on November 13, 1982. 
Designed to facilitate greater collective bargaining throughout French 
industrial relations, provisions in this legislation "elicited the greatest 
number of both favorable and hostile reactions" (Glendon,  1984:472). 
Law III effectively mandated periodic negotiations between unions and 
employers at both the firm and industry levels.  At the firm level, if 
workers were unionized, negotiations had to take place at least once a 
year with respect to wages and hours.  At the industry level, 
negotiations over wages and hours had to take place once a year if that 
particular industry was already covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement (Smith, 1987:49).  In each of these cases, however, there  
was no legal obligation to reach a collective bargaining agreement. 
Unions and employers simply had to meet and discuss in good faith 
issues of concern to them.  The Mitterrand administration's rationale 
was that such periodic meetings would "encourage a movement away 
from confrontation and negotiation under crisis conditions toward a 
continuing dialogue between what it viewed as 'the social partners"' 
(Glendon,  1984:472). 
Auroux Law IV, titled Committees on Health, Safety, and 
Working Conditions, and Law V, labeled Democratization  of the 
Public Sector, were enacted on December 23, 1982 and July 26, 1983, 
respectively.  Law IV empowered individual workers with respect to 
health and safety issues in the workplace by mandating that companies 
with more that fifty employees establish committees to monitor, 
inspect, and improve such conditions.  Law V focused specifically on 
public sector employees and extended earlier private sector provisions 
to this sphere.  Law V also entailed provisions expanding the amount 
 
 
 
 
 
of employee representation on the governing boards of public 
enterprises (Glendon,  1984:481-482). 
These five pieces of legislation constitute the Mitterrand 
administration's labor law reforms of the early 1980s.  While more 
legislation was in the works, specifically regarding the form and 
functioning of the expression groups, political fortunes did not allow 
the realization of these plans.  In 1986 the Socialist Party lost its 
majority in the National Assembly and Mitterrand was forced to work 
with more conservative elements that did not have the empowerment 
of workers and unions high on their agenda.  Regardless, the main 
elements of the autogestionnaire project had been implemented, with 
over one third of the existing French Labor Code having been revised 
and amended (Smith, 1987:48).  In the next section, I address the 
effects that these policy reforms had on the French organized labor 
movement. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF LABOR LAW REFORM ON UNIONS IN 
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE 
When cast in a comparative light, striking similarities and 
differences are revealed about the labor law reforms taking place in 
Great Britain and France during the 1980s.  In terms of convergence, 
the labor law programs of the Thatcher and Mitterrand administrations 
were each embedded within broader state projects deemed fairly 
radical at that particular historical juncture.   Specifically, Thatcher's 
'neo-liberal revolution' and Mitterrand's 'socialist experiment' each 
represented significant policy departures in terms of recent political 
economic practices within the two nations.  More significantly, each 
government also converged in their reliance on the substantial 
legislative reform of industrial relations as a means to facilitate 
national economic recovery.  In addition, the legislation passed by both 
governments specifically targeted the role of organized labor as one 
means to achieve broader policy objectives. 
Of course, these surface similarities pale in comparison to the 
significant substantive differences in terms of the content of the two 
 
 
 
 
labor law projects.  Though the Thatcher and Mitterrand governments 
each utilized similar political tools to restructure the conduct of 
industrial relations within their respective countries, the specific  
effects that each hoped their labor law reforms would achieve were, as 
noted above, starkly in contrast.  Thus, the question now is: how did 
the two administrations fare in attaining the desired outcomes of their 
respective labor law projects?  With some important exceptions that 
are addressed in the next section, I would argue that the Thatcher 
administration's labor law project was fundamentally successful in 
undermining the British organized labor movement.   Inlooking at 
union density, for example, an often used but by no means 
comprehensive indicator of union strength, there is a significant  
decline from 1980 through the present.  In 1980, 45% of private sector 
employees in Great Britain and 69% of that country's public sector 
workers belonged to unions.  In 1999, only 19% of British private 
sector workers were unionized, while the proportion of public sector 
employees in unions fell less markedly to 60% (Visser, 2000:4). 
There are other factors contributing to this decline in British 
unionization levels however.  Broader structural economic 
transformations, the changing organization and composition of labor 
markets, and business cycle factors, for example, each played a part in 
decreasing union membership rolls and thus reduced overall density 
(Shackleton,  1998:589-91).  Indeed, these same forces negatively 
impacted union density in a wide array of Western capitalist 
democracies (e.g. OECD, 1997).  Nevertheless, even when these 
broader variables are taken into account, the effects of Thatcher's labor 
legislation still remain significant.  Freeman and Pelletier (1990), for 
instance, assessed the impact of legislative changes on British union 
density between  1945 and 1986 while systematically controlling for 
economic and other relevant factors.  Their conclusion was that "the 
vast bulk of the observed 1980s decline in union density in the UK is 
due to the changed legal environment for  industrial relations" 
(Freeman and Pelletier,  1990:156; emphasis in original). 
 
 
 
Other indicators concerning the vitality of the organized labor 
movement in Great Britain also point to a successful outcome for the 
Thatcher labor law project.  Labor union recognition in workplaces 
with twenty-five or more employees fell steadily, from 64% in 1980 to 
53% in 1990, and down further to 47% by 1995.  The percentage of 
workers covered by collective bargaining contracts also declined, from 
71% in 1984 to 54% in 1990  (Shackleton,  1998:591-592).  Closed 
shops also suffered marked setbacks.  Covering over five million 
workers during the late 1970s, only 400,000 were employed in closed 
shops by 1990.  Indeed, the future looked quite bleak for workplaces 
with restrictive union membership agreements, since after "the 1990 
Employment Act they have no legal basis and a worker who could 
show that he or she was excluded by such an arrangement would be 
eligible for substantial compensation" (Shackleton,  1998:593). 
Industrial action by unions, in particular strike activity, was 
another area singled out by the Thatcher administration's labor law 
policy.  The strike is one of organized labor's most important 
bargaining tools, and the ability for effective strike action clearly has 
implications for union power in other areas as well.  As noted by 
Brown and Wadhwani (1990:60), British strike data "demonstrates [a] 
substantial decline in the number of stoppages in the 1980s" as well as 
a decrease in the number of working days lost due to strikes.  Whereas 
the number of strikes over five year periods was consistently well 
above 2000 from 1960 to 1979, the number of stoppages reported 
between  1980 and 1984 dropped to 1363.  Only 943 strikes occurred 
between  1985 and 1988, a pace that indicated a further downward 
trend.  The number of working days lost per 1000 employees also 
declined significantly during the 1980s (Brown and Wadhwani, 
1990:60). 
I am fully aware that, just as in the case of union density, factors 
beyond changes in labor law policy also influence the aforementioned 
indicators.  However, particularly when it comes to the closed shop 
and industrial action, I would maintain that the Thatcher 
administration's labor law project certainly had a significant negative 
 
 
 
 
effect on labor union power in Great Britain.  Thus, the Thatcher 
administration could be said to have been largely successful in 
attaining its intended objectives. There are of course a few exceptions, 
which I will address in the next section. 
What then about the success of the Mitterrand government's labor 
law project, designed to empower French labor unions and promote the 
spread of collective bargaining?  To begin, if union density figures are 
again taken as broad indicators of organized labor's strength, it would 
have to be concluded that the Auroux laws did not have their intended 
effects.  In 1981, 18% of workers in France's private sector and 44% in 
its public sector were unionized.  By 1993, density rates had dropped 
dramatically, with only 4% and 25% of French employees belonging 
to unions in the private and public spheres, respectively (Visser, 
2000:4). 
The effects of the Auroux Laws become more evident if one looks 
at their impact in key areas specifically addressed by the legislation. 
Recall that central to Law I was the attempt to further workplace 
democracy by mandating the establishment of employee expression 
groups within firms.  In looking at this objective, the overall problem 
appears not to be in establishing such groups, since by the mid-1980s 
worker expression programs had existed "in one half of the applicable 
firms" (Moss, 1988:325).  Rather, the key trouble spots emerged with 
respect to who established the expression groups and how they 
functioned.  In terms of the creation of expression groups, the law 
called for a collaborative process between management and unions or 
other employee representatives.  For the most part, however, unions 
and workers "were timid and skeptical" about the groups (Ross, 
1987:212), and "[i]nitiative almost invariably belonged to 
management, which trained staff in leadership techniques, scheduled 
the meetings and explained their purpose" (Moss, 1988:324). 
More significant than how they were established is how the expression 
groups functioned once in operation. As one observer found, 
"employers ...largely 'contained' expression groups and...harnessed 
 
 
 
 
them to a broader management policy of building employee 
identification with the firm" (Smith, 1987:53).  In effect, a strategy 
was pursued that "undercut the unions' traditional role as mediating 
agent between employees and management by 'individualising' the 
worker-management  relationship" (Smith, 1987:53).  The tactic 
apparently worked, as evidenced in part by declining union 
membership but also by the tum-around in employer attitudes toward 
the 'right of expression' provisions of the new legislation.  Initially 
opposed to the expression groups, employers became increasingly 
satisfied with their performance as the 1980s progressed (Moss, 
1988:326). 
Another objective of the new labor laws was to reinforce and 
expand the role of existing mechanisms for worker representation. 
Law II extended the right to form a union to smaller firms; allowed 
union leaders the right to perform more tasks within the workplace on 
company time; and strengthened the position of shop floor committees 
and employee representative institutions.  Ironically, these provisions 
had two unanticipated effects that further undermined the vitality of 
French unions.  One effect was that union membership became less 
necessary as other forms of representation, expression groups included, 
became more institutionalized (Smith, 1987:55).  Another was that 
"the reinforcement of representative institutions in the workplace 
...enmeshed already overtaxed union militants in deeper levels of 
bureaucracy" (Ross, 1987:212). 
Collective bargaining was another area addressed by the 
Mitterrand government's labor law reforms.  Recall that Law III 
required annual negotiations between unions and employers at all 
firms where there was at least one union section, even if there had been 
no previous collective bargaining arrangements, and at the industry 
level if an agreement was already in existence.  As intended, collective 
bargaining did in fact increase throughout the French industrial 
relations system (Ross, 1987:212; Smith, 1987:56).  Two important 
points need to be made in this regard however.  First, since there was 
an "obligation to negotiate" but not an "obligation to reach agreement", 
 
 
 
 
 
relatively few collective bargaining agreements were ever established 
(Ross, 1987:212).  Indeed, by the mid-1980s only about 10% of the 
labor force was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Smith, 
1987:56).  Second, the majority of agreements that were established 
were at the level of the firm rather than covering an entire industrial 
sector (Moss, 1988:325-327).  The end result was that the French 
organized labor movement, which traditionally exercised its strength at 
the industry-wide level, was slowly transformed into a less effective 
type of "enterprise unionism" (Howell,  1996:153). 
Overall, then, trade union power in France declined significantly 
throughout the 1980s and beyond.  Factors other than labor law, most 
notably a similar array of structural and cyclical economic forces that 
were evident in the British case, clearly played some role in this 
waning of union influence as well.  But the labor law reforms 
implemented by the Mitterrand government in the early 1980s, despite 
the intention of strengthening the role of labor unions in French 
industrial affairs, also contributed to the decline because of the various 
paradoxical and unintended effects recounted above.  Inthis regard, 
the labor law project of Mitterrand and the Socialist party would have 
to be deemed a fundamental failure. 
 
THE PROBLEMATIC  NATURE OF LABOR LAW REFORM 
The British and French labor law projects of the early 1980s had 
problematic outcomes that were sometimes very marked and often 
very difficult to anticipate.  While the labor law policies of the 
Thatcher administration were widely successful in achieving the 
primary objective of weakening labor unions, there were also effects, 
addressed below, that may have unintentionally empowered British 
organized labor.  The problematic character of the Mitterrand 
government's Auroux project is glaringly evident, for as I have 
described above, its intended aim of strengthening French unions did 
not occur and it can be argued that the new legislation ultimately 
served to further undermine organized labor.  Overall, such outcomes 
 
 
 
should not be entirely surprising, for any state project, whatever its 
character or goals, is inherently marked by contingency, contradiction 
and conflict as attempts are made at its ideal realization.  I would argue 
that this especially true in the case of state projects that entail strategic 
manipulations of the law. 
In light of the comparative analysis presented above, problematic 
outcomes with respect to attaining broader political objectives through 
the use of legal reforms appear to spring from two key sources. One 
source is internal to the character of the legislation being implemented. 
For example, the rational coherence of a particular legislative initiative 
is by no means given, and there may often be conflicting, if not 
contradictory, potentials embedded within the same law. The National 
Labor Relations Act passed in the United States in 1935 is a case in 
point. This legislation was "marked by indeterminacy, openness and 
divergency" and could have just as easily led to a robust form of 
industrial democracy rather than the contractualist business unionism 
that eventually developed (Klare, 1978:291). Along these same lines, 
Howell (1996:148) notes that the Mitterrand administration's Auroux 
reforms "contained two distinct and coherent, but incompatible, 
logics". One logic, the one that the socialist government hoped would 
be realized, could lead toward more widespread collective bargaining 
with strengthened trade unions having a "critical role [as] privileged 
representatives of the working class" (Howell, 1996:148). The other 
logic, and the one that came to dominate, involved worker expression 
groups and other employee representative institutions becoming 
"alternatives to union organization" and producing a 
"microcorporatist" enterprise unionism (Howell, 1996:149; emphasis 
in original). 
The internal character of legislation can also lead to problematic 
outcomes even in the relative absence of contradictory potentials or 
tendencies within the law.  For example, the Thatcher administration's 
provisions concerning the democratization of unions generally had an 
overriding coherence and consistency.  However, the British 
government miscalculated that greater input by the rank and file would 
 
 
 
 
 
 
attenuate industrial conflict because it had falsely assumed that it was 
union leaders who were excessively militant and not the rank and file. 
As the 1980s progressed, union ballots on industrial action often 
received widespread membership support and attained greater 
legitimacy because the issue had been voted on (Dunn and Metcalf, 
1996).  The same pattern was evident with respect to ballots on union 
political funds, for membership voting "had the unexpected effect of 
commanding a high level of support for such funds" (Brown and 
Wadhwani,  1990:61). 
Another source of contingency when it comes to state-directed 
legislative programs has more to do with external factors rather than 
with those internal to the law itself. As Ross (1987:212) put it with 
respect to the Mitterrand government's labor law project, "[t]he final 
outcomes of reforms like the Auroux Laws depend on the relative 
strengths and intentions of labor and capital over the long run". Two 
related issues make themselves evident here. One concerns the 
intentions of actors to whom the law applies, specifically if and how 
they use the new legislation. For example, in the case of Britain, the 
Thatcher administration's stringent restrictions on strike activity were 
not initially taken advantage of by many employers. However, as the 
1980s progressed, more and more employers did become aware of 
their effectiveness and began using them more frequently. One can 
only speculate that if this change in management's use of the law did 
not occur, would the Thatcher labor law project have ended in failure? 
In the case of France, Inoted above that it was employers who first 
took advantage of the provisions concerning workplace expression 
groups. The relative inaction of unions in this regard resulted in 
expression groups being primarily designed and run by management. 
Had French unions taken a more proactive role earlier on, perhaps the 
'logic' inherent in the Auroux Laws that empowered unions would 
have been realized, and not the 'logic' that ultimately displaced unions. 
Again, one can only speculate on this historical possibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
A second issue pertains to the relative strength of the parties 
involved.  For example, part of the reason why French employers were 
able to achieve their vision for how expression groups would function 
in the workplace may have been because the Auroux Laws were 
implemented in an economic context where capital had a significant 
advantage over labor.  Thus, even if they had pursued their new legal 
rights more vigorously, unions in France may not have been able to 
realize the full potential of the law in the face of employer opposition 
(Howell, 1996:149).  In the case of Britain, employers also had a 
similar position of power over organized labor, and they were able to 
use the new management-friendly  laws with great effectiveness to 
further undermine the organized labor movement.  Of course, when 
labor legislation very similar in content to that of the Thatcher 
administration was implemented in a context where unions were 
relatively more powerful, such as occurred with the Heath 
administration's Industrial Relation Act of 1971, recall from above that 
a totally different outcome ensued. 
Overall, then, a wide array of factors can make it exceedingly 
problematic for political actors to easily accomplish specific policy 
objectives through the use of legislative means.  The two cases of labor 
law reform that I have described here perhaps exemplify two extremes 
toward which such state projects can gravitate.  On the one hand you 
have the relatively successful realization of the Thatcher 
administration's neo-liberal project to weaken the British organized 
labor movement.  On the other you have the fundamental failure of the 
Mitterrand government's socialist project, which ultimately further 
debilitated the unions it had hoped to empower. 
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